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Abstract—This paper analyzes the sensitivity of antineutrino
count rate measurements to changes in the fissile content of
civil power reactors. Such measurements may be useful in
IAEA reactor safeguards applications. We introduce a hypothesis
testing procedure to identify statistically significant differences
between the antineutrino count rate evolution of a standard
’baseline’ fuel cycle and that of an anomalous cycle, in which
plutonium is removed and replaced with an equivalent fissile
worth of uranium. The test would allow an inspector to detect
anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm that the
reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared fuel
inventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable choice
of detector parameters, the test can detect replacement of 73 kg
of plutonium in 90 days with 95% probability, while controlling
the false positive rate at 5%. We show that some improvement
on this level of sensitivity may be expected by various means,
including use of the method in conjunction with existing reactor
safeguards methods. We also identify a necessary and sufficient
daily antineutrino count rate to achieve the quoted sensitivity,
and list examples of detectors in which such rates have been
attained.
Index Terms—Safeguards applications, neutrinos, nuclear
monitoring, nuclear power plants, nuclear power simulation,
particle detectors
I. INTRODUCTION
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear
safeguards regime is designed to detect diversion of fissile
material from civil nuclear fuel cycle facilities to weapons
programs [1]. In previous work, we predicted [2] and demon-
strated [3],[4],[5] that cubic meter scale antineutrino detectors,
operating at a distance of tens of meters from a 1 gigawatt
electric (GWe) pressurized water reactor (PWR), can directly
detect changes in operational status, power levels, and fissile
inventory of the reactor core. Similar results were achieved
earlier by a Russian group [6]. These metrics are all of
potential use for the IAEA reactor safeguards regime.
In this paper, we demonstrate a possible methodology for
using antineutrino detection in a safeguards context. We in-
troduce a hypothesis testing procedure to identify statistically
significant differences between the antineutrino count rate
evolution of a standard ’baseline’ fuel cycle and that of an
anomalous cycle in which 73 kg of plutonium has been
removed and replaced with the equivalent fissile worth of
uranium. (This quantity of plutonium represents the removal
and replacement of ten partially burnt assemblies with ten
fresh fuel assemblies.) The test would allow an inspector to
detect anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm that
the reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared
fuel inventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable
choice of detector parameters, the test can detect the net loss
from the core of 73 kg of plutonium in 90 days with 95%
probability, while controlling the false positive rate at 5%.
The purpose of the study is to explore this possible alter-
native method of reactor safeguards, by quantifying the sensi-
tivity of an antineutrino count rate measurement to anomalous
changes in fissile content. In describing our example, we avoid
the standard IAEA term ’diversion’, since we do not explicitly
specify the fate of the removed plutonium. In particular,
we are not asserting that the removal of plutonium in this
example could not be uncovered by existing IAEA safeguards
methodologies.
One of IAEA’s inspection goals is to be able to detect
diversion of 8 kg 1 of plutonium from a civil nuclear facility
in a 90-day period [8]. Our current sensitivity to anomalous
reactor operation caused by removal of plutonium is at the
level of several significant quantities. Enhancements to the
detector, including the capability to measure the antineutrino
energy spectrum, may allow for detection of even smaller
changes in the reactor’s fissile content. While the demon-
strated sensitivity is not to actual diversion but to anomalous
reactor operations, we expect that this method can be used
in conjunction with existing IAEA safeguards methodologies
to achieve IAEA SQ goals for diverted material. We note
that other IAEA surveillance and accountancy measurement
devices do not in isolation reach the SQ goals, but are used
as part of a comprehensive accountancy strategy. Examples
include Cherenkov light monitors in spent fuel cooling ponds,
which are not sensitive at the SQ level, but which provide
continuity of knowledge and confirm the presence of large
numbers of radioactive spent fuel assemblies.
We begin by briefly describing the relationship between
the antineutrino count rate and the reactor fissile inventory,
and contrast our method for anomaly detection with current
IAEA reactor safeguards practice. Next, we describe the test
procedure and its inputs, including the fuel loadings of the
baseline and anomalous scenario cycles. We then examine
the statistical power of the procedure to distinguish between
the two cycles and thereby identify an anomaly in reactor
operations. We include the effects of counting statistics, a fixed
18 kg is designated by the IAEA as a ’significant quantity’ (SQ) of
plutonium. The IAEA definition of a significant quantity is ’the approximate
quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into account any
conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear
explosive device cannot be excluded’ [7].
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2systematic bias in detector response, deliberate malfeasance on
the part of the reactor operator, the starting point and duration
of data acquisition, and simulation errors. We also establish a
range of acceptable detector masses, intrinsic efficiencies and
standoff distances that would permit discovery of the anomaly
in our example. We conclude by summarizing the potential
impact of this approach on current IAEA safeguards and useful
next steps.
In this paper, we assume that the background count rates are
negligible relative to those produced by the antineutrino signal.
This assumption is based on high signal-to-background ratios
achieved in several past experiments, discussed in Section VI.
If these ratios are not achieved, the results described here do
not apply, and an additional analysis would be required to
account for the effects of higher background rates.
II. CURRENT IAEA REACTOR SAFEGUARDS AND
ANTINEUTRINO-BASED SAFEGUARDS
Currently, the IAEA uses nuclear material accountancy,
as well as containment and surveillance (CS) techniques to
verify the quantities of fuel used in and discharged from
reactors. Nuclear material accountancy refers to a quantitative
and independent check of fuel inventories, performed by the
Agency. At reactors, the predominant material accountancy
method is item accountancy, or counting of items (fresh and
spent fuel assemblies and rods) considered to contain fixed
and known quantities of fissile material. The presence and
integrity of radioactive spent fuel assemblies and rods in
cooling ponds at the reactor is also checked by Cherenkov
light measurements and other methods. CS techniques, such
as videocameras and seals on the reactor head, are also used
[7].
By contrast, antineutrino-based safeguards offer a form of
near-real-time and nondestructive bulk accountancy. In con-
trast to item accountancy, bulk accountancy methods provide
estimates of the total fissile mass without relying on assump-
tions about the mass contents of premeasured items. Examples
include coincidence neutron counting, mass spectroscopy and
chemical analyses. As such, antineutrino based methods are
complementary to the existing safeguards regime, since they
provide independent quantitative information about fissile ma-
terial inventories as long as the reactor is operational. Among
other uses, this information can provide independent confir-
mation that the fuel inventory at beginning and throughout
the reactor cycle is consistent with operator declarations. In
principle, the inventory estimate so derived can also be used
to check for shipper/receiver differences, both for fresh fuel
taken in by the operator and for spent fuel sent to downstream
reprocessing or storage facilities.
While the measurement capability appears promising, its
actual import for IAEA safeguards is beyond the scope of
this paper. As an example of the complications that arise,
we note that for existing power reactors, the antineutrino-
based inventory estimates would have to be reconciled with
and integrated into the full accounting of all materials at the
reactor site, including that in spent fuel cooling ponds. For
such sites, with decades of accumulated and largely unas-
sayed fuel, containing many tens of tons of fissile material,
such accounting may prove impractical. For this reason, we
recommend that a more detailed analysis of the capability be
conducted by safeguards experts, both for existing and future
reactor safeguards regimes.
III. MODELING THE ANTINEUTRINO COUNT RATE FOR
SAFEGUARDS APPLICATIONS
A change in fissile mass content in a reactor core - such
as that occurring when uranium is consumed and plutonium
produced in the course of a reactor fuel cycle - creates a
measurable systematic shift in the antineutrino count rate (and
energy spectrum). In previous work [5], we have shown that
the antineutrino count rate is reduced by about 10% relative
to its value at the beginning of the cycle over the course of a
typical 1.5 year pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel cycle.
This reduction occurs even when (as is typical) the reactor
maintains constant power throughout the cycle; therefore,
monitoring the antineutrino count rate provides information
about core fissile inventory evolution that is not accessible
through a measurement of the reactor power alone.
In a safeguards context, the measured antineutrino count
rate evolution would be compared to a predicted count rate
evolution assuming normal conditions (i.e., no removal of
plutonium) over some portion or all of the fuel cycle. The
predicted evolution under normal operating conditions will
be referred to as the “baseline scenario” for the remainder
of this paper. The prediction is obtained from a reactor
simulation code, such as ORIGEN [9], which takes as inputs
the operator-declared thermal power and initial fissile isotopic
masses, as well as other reactor parameters, and returns fission
rates for each isotope. The individual fission rates are then
converted into a predicted emitted antineutrino flux using
standard analytical formulae. The emitted antineutrino flux
is finally converted to a measured antineutrino count rate,
using a detector response function derived from experiment
and modeling.
In the present work, we simulate both the baseline and
anomalous antineutrino count rates over the course of the
fuel cycle for use in our hypothesis test. We use an ORI-
GEN simulation of the core of Unit 2 of the San Onofre
Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS), originally published in
[10]. The detector response function was derived from the
SONGS1 experiment [2], for which the antineutrino signal
was approximately 360 counts per day at beginning of cycle
after subtraction of reactor-off backgrounds.
Following [6], we describe the PWR core antineutrino count
rate evolution Nν¯(t) at time t in the fuel cycle as a product
of two time-dependent factors:
Nν¯(t) = Pth(t) · γ(1 + k(t)). (1)
Pth(t) is the reactor thermal power. The term (1 + k(t))
depends on the changing fissile isotopic content of the core,
embodied in the parameter k(t). γ is a constant related
to the detector mass, efficiency, and standoff distance. This
parametrization highlights the direct dependence of the count
rate on the thermal power, an important consideration we
return to in Section V-D.
3For the PWR core being considered here, (1) is well
approximated by a quadratic function of time:
Nν¯(t) = β0 + β1t+ β2t
2. (2)
The quadratic model in (2) is valid for PWRs loaded with
typical Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel. Other fuel loadings
and reactor types can result in an antineutrino count rate
evolution that is substantially different in form from (2).
The coefficients β0, β1 and β2 in (2) can be used to
detect a departure from the baseline scenario. The measured
antineutrino count rate evolution can be used to estimate the
coefficients, which can then be compared to those predicted
for the baseline scenario. A statistically significant difference
in at least one of the estimated coefficients from its baseline
counterpart could indicate a departure of the observed evolu-
tion from that of the baseline scenario.
IV. TESTING FOR ANOMALOUS ACTIVITY
Following the model in (2), the true baseline evolution of
antineutrino count rate as a function of time t in the fuel cycle
is given by
N
(B)
ν¯ (t) = β
(B)
0 + β
(B)
1 t+ β
(B)
2 t
2 (3)
(The superscript “B” in the above equation and for the
remainder of the paper indicates “baseline”). As discussed
earlier, the true baseline evolution is obtained from a reactor
simulation. To account for simulation error, we modify the
model in (3) by representing the baseline count rate at time t
as Gaussian with the mean equal to the simulation value and
the standard deviation equal to 1% of the simulation value,
i.e.,
N
(B)
ν¯ (t) ∼ Gaussian(µ(t), 0.01µ(t)). (4)
µ(t) is the baseline evolution antineutrino count rate value at
time t from the simulation and can be modeled as
µ(t) = β
(B)
0 + β
(B)
1 t+ β
(B)
2 t
2. (5)
One percent random error is typical for these and other ORI-
GEN simulations [10],[11]. (Systematic shifts of the predicted
and measured response are treated separately in Section V-C.)
Let {N (M)ν¯ (t)} denote the measured count rate evolution
(the superscript “M” indicates “measured”) which is to be
tested against the baseline scenario evolution. Since the mea-
surements follow Poisson statistics,
N
(M)
ν¯ (t) ∼ Poisson(β(M)0 + β(M)1 t+ β(M)2 t2). (6)
To determine whether the measured antineutrino count rate
evolution deviates significantly from that of the baseline, we
can compare the coefficient β(B)i in (5) to its counterpart β
(M)
i
in (6) for each i = 0, 1, 2. This requires us to estimate each
of these coefficients.
One way to do this is to perform the least squares (LS)
regression of both the modeled baseline count rates N (B)ν¯ (t)
and the measured count rates N (M)ν¯ (t) on t and t2. LS
regression is best suited to the case of Gaussian noise with
constant variance [12]. In our case, the baseline count rates
do in fact have Gaussian noise by construction, and high
Poisson statistics make the noise in the measured count rates
approximately Gaussian. Moreover, as noted in Section III, the
change in the count rate variance over the course of the cycle
for a standard PWR is about 10%. Thus, LS regression should
produce statistically near-optimal coefficient estimates in this
context (if necessary, weighted least squares regression could
be used to alleviate the issue of non-constant variance).
Of greater concern for the regression analysis is that t
and t2 are highly correlated, which can lead to very unstable
coefficient estimates. A common way to overcome this prob-
lem is to perform regression on deviations from the sample
mean of times (t − t¯) and deviations from the mean squared
(t − t¯)2 because the correlation between these two terms is
substantially lower than that between t and t2 [12]. Therefore,
we reparameterize the model for the measured count rates
N
(M)
ν¯ (t) in (6) as follows:
N
(M)
ν¯ (t) ∼ Poisson(γ(M)0 +γ(M)1 (t− t¯)+γ(M)2 (t− t¯)2). (7)
We must also reparametrize the model in (5). The baseline
count rate N (B)ν¯ (t) still follows (4), but the baseline mean
function µ(t) is now given by
µ(t) = γ
(B)
0 + γ
(B)
1 (t− t¯) + γ(B)2 (t− t¯)2. (8)
Each coefficient γ(M)i in (7) can then be compared to its
counterpart γ(B)i in (8) for i = 0, 1, 2 by testing the following
pairs of hypotheses:
H(0)o : γ
(M)
0 = γ
(B)
0 versus H
(0)
a : γ
(M)
0 6= γ(B)0
H(1)o : γ
(M)
1 = γ
(B)
1 versus H
(1)
a : γ
(M)
1 6= γ(B)1 (9)
H(2)o : γ
(M)
2 = γ
(B)
2 versus H
(2)
a : γ
(M)
2 6= γ(B)2
The test procedure then consists of the following steps:
1) Generate {N (B)ν¯ (t)} according to (4).
2) Obtain coefficient estimates γˆ(B)0 , γˆ
(B)
1 and γˆ
(B)
2 , and
their standard errors se(γˆ(B)0 ), se(γˆ
(B)
1 ) and se(γˆ
(B)
2 )
from the least squares regression of generated count rates
{N (B)ν¯ (t)} on time deviations (t− t¯) and time deviations
squared (t − t¯)2 (where t¯ is the sample average of all
the time values t).
3) Similarly, obtain coefficient estimates γˆ(M)0 , γˆ
(M)
1 and
γˆ
(M)
2 , and their standard errors se(γˆ
(M)
0 ), se(γˆ
(M)
1 ) and
se(γˆ
(M)
2 ) from the least squares regression of measured
count rates {N (M)ν¯ (t)} on (t− t¯) and (t− t¯)2.
4) Obtain test statistics
si =
γˆ
(M)
i − γˆ(B)i√
se2(γˆ
(M)
i ) + se
2(γˆ
(B)
i )
(10)
for i = 0, 1, 2 and their corresponding p-values, given
by
pi = 2 · P (S > |si|) (11)
where S has a Student’s t distribution with 2 · (n − 3)
degrees of freedom with n equal to the number of count
rate measurements.
5) Determine the acceptable false positive (FP) rate (see
Section V) and apply the false discovery rate (FDR)
4procedure, described in [13]2, to determine whether to
reject each of the H(i)o in favor of H
(i)
a in (9). If at
least one of the null hypotheses is rejected, conclude that
the measured evolution deviates significantly from that
of the baseline. Otherwise, conclude that the measured
evolution does not significantly deviate from that of the
baseline.
V. TEST PERFORMANCE
The test can produce two types of errors: it could find a sig-
nificant difference from the baseline in at least one coefficient
when the evolution was in fact produced by a baseline scenario
(a false positive, or FP, result), or it could miss a significant
difference in all coefficients when the evolution was different
from the baseline (a false negative, or FN, result).
The complement of the FN rate is the true positive (TP)
rate. The TP rate is defined as the probability of finding a
significant difference in at least one of the coefficients from
its baseline counterpart when the evolution in question is in
fact different from that of the baseline. A good test has a
low FP rate and a high TP rate. There is a trade-off between
these two quantities: all else being equal, increasing the TP
rate of the test comes at a price of a higher FP rate. A
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve for a particular
test procedure shows the former as a function of the latter, thus
allowing one to determine the minimum FP rate that yields the
desired TP rate.
A. ROC Curve Simulation
To estimate the ROC curve of the test, we carried out a
simulation (not to be confused with the reactor simulation)
that estimates the TP rate of the test for a given FP rate.
This simulation was performed for a scenario in which ten
once-burned assemblies with the highest plutonium content
are removed and replaced with 3.91% enriched fresh fuel.
This represents the removal of 73 kg of 239Pu from the
core. Complete fissile inventories at beginning of cycle for
the baseline and anomalous scenario are shown in Table I.
TABLE I
THE INITIAL INVENTORIES OF THE MAIN FISSIONING ISOTOPES FOR THE
BASELINE AND ANOMALOUS SCENARIOS. THE FINAL COLUMN IS THE
DIFFERENCE IN FISSILE CONTENT BETWEEN THE TWO SCENARIOS. A
NEGATIVE (POSITIVE) VALUE INDICATES THAT THE ISOTOPE WAS
REMOVED (ADDED) IN THE ANOMALOUS SCENARIO.
Isotope Baseline mass Anomalous scenario Mass difference
(kg) mass (kg) (kg)
235U 2834 2849 15
238U 82912 83351 439
239Pu 225 152 -73
241Pu 21 12 -9
Fig. 1 shows the antineutrino count rate evolutions predicted
by the ORIGEN simulation for the baseline scenario (solid
green) and the anomalous scenario (red). (The shifted baseline
evolution, shown in dashed green, is discussed in Section
V-D).
2As described in more detail in [13], the FDR procedure controls the error
rate of testing multiple hypotheses.
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Fig. 1. Baseline (solid green), shifted baseline (dashed green) and anomalous
(red) scenario evolutions of daily antineutrino count rates versus time (in
days), as simulated in ORIGEN.
A given point on a ROC curve is obtained as follows. One
hundred thousand pairs of anomalous and baseline evolutions
are generated, with the former from a Poisson distribution with
the coefficients γ(M)i , i = 0, 1, 2, obtained from the ORIGEN
reactor simulation for the given scenario and time period, and
the latter from a Gaussian distribution according to (4). The
test procedure introduced in Section IV is then applied at the
given FP rate (the x coordinate of the point on the ROC curve)
to each pair of evolutions. We then estimate the TP rate (the y
coordinate of the point on the ROC curve) with the fraction of
the 100,000 evolution pairs for which at least one of the null
hypotheses in (9) is rejected. This is repeated for a sequence
of FP rate values from 0 to 1, thus producing a curve. The
large number of generated evolutions ensures that every TP
rate estimate is within 1% of the relevant true TP rate.
To verify that the nominal FP rate of our test procedure
corresponds to its actual FP rate, we also generated 100,000
baseline evolutions from a Poisson distribution with the coef-
ficients γ(B)i , i = 0, 1, 2, obtained from the ORIGEN reactor
simulation, for the given time period. We estimated the actual
FP rates with the fractions of these evolutions for which at
least one of the null hypotheses in (9) was rejected and found
them to be very close to the nominal FP rates.
While the performance of the test will depend on the
specific scenario, the present example allows us to identify
several important factors that influence our ability to detect
any anomalous reactor operation. In the following sections we
assess the impact on our test performance of finite counting
statistics, systematic error in the detector response, operator
malfeasance, and the starting point and duration of data
acquisition within the cycle.
B. Effect of Counting Statistics
For the evolutions shown in Fig. 1, antineutrino count rates
range from approximately 375 per day at the beginning of
cycle to approximately 335 per day at the end of cycle. As
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Fig. 2. ROC curves for the test using days 0–90, assuming low counts
(orange) and high counts (purple). The dotted vertical line corresponds to the
FP rate of 5%, while the dashed and dotted horizontal line corresponds to the
TP rate of 95%.
discussed in Section VI, easily achievable increases in the
combined detector mass and efficiency can lead to a five-fold
improvement in counting statistics. We considered the impact
of these changes on the test performance, simply by increasing
the count rate used in our test by a factor of 5.
Fig. 2 shows that this dramatically improves the perfor-
mance of the test. The ROC curve for high count rates
collected over the first 90 days in the cycle, shown in purple,
is up to six times higher than the ROC curve for the low
count rates for the same time period, shown in orange. For
example, at the FP rate of 5%, the high count TP rate of the
former is 95%, while the low count TP rate is 34%. This strong
effect was observed for other data acquisition periods. These
results, as well as those discussed in Sections V-D and V-E, are
summarized in Table II. For the particular scenario considered
here, we verified that a minimum five-fold improvement in
counting statistics is necessary in order to achieve a 95% TP
rate at the 5% FP rate. This was accomplished by progressively
increasing the count rate in the testing procedure until the 95%
TP% / 5% FP standard was achieved.
TABLE II
TRUE POSITIVE RATES (IN %) AT THE FALSE POSITIVE RATE OF 5% FOR
THE VARIOUS FACTORS CONSIDERED HERE. SEE TEXT FOR AN
EXPLANATION OF EACH FACTOR.
2000 counts 375 counts
Dura- per day per day
tion Un- Shifted Due To Un-
(days) shifted Mal- Detector Bias shifted
fesance Uncorr. Corrected
first 30 58
first 90 95 23 0.4 12 34
first 180 62
first 250 99 56 96
last 90 32
last 250 73
500 99.99 99
C. Effect of a Systematic Shift in Detector Response
Systematic shifts in the detector response could cause
upward or downward shifts in the measured antineutrino count
rate. In that case, even if fuel has not been removed, the detec-
tor measurements may deviate significantly from the predicted
baseline evolution. In this section we analyze the consequences
of such shifts for the hypothesis testing procedure.
The absolute count rate of reactor antineutrinos has been
measured with 3% systematic uncertainty [14]. Antineutrino
count rate measurements made relative to an initial value
have a considerably smaller systematic error, of less than
1% [15], since fixed systematic errors present in the absolute
measurement are cancelled by subtraction. As we will show,
a hypothesis test that uses antineutrino count rate trajectories
made relative to a premeasured value are much less sensitive
to systematic detector shifts than a test on data not referred to
an initial value.
In an actual safeguards deployment, a detector bias would
become evident by a comparison of measured and predicted
antineutrino counts integrated over a few weeks. For example,
with measured antineutrino count rates of 2000 counts per
day, 20 days of data acquisition would suffice to reduce
the statistical error to 0.5%, small enough to measure a
few percent difference between predicted and actual rates.
In the context of the hypothesis test considered here, such a
shift can be mistakenly interpreted as evidence for anomalous
reactor operations, or correctly as a previously undiscovered
systematic shift in the detector response, not attributable to the
anomaly.
We examined the impact of a systematic shift incorrectly
interpreted as evidence for anomalous reactor operations. We
adjusted both the baseline and anomalous measured count
rate evolutions by 1%. (We report only a downward shift
result, which is conservatively worse than the impact of
the upward shift for the scenarios considered here). A 1%
absolute systematic error is smaller than that typically ob-
tained in reactor antineutrino experiments, but is already large
enough to illustrate the strong impact of detector bias. Fig.
3 shows the resulting shifted baseline and anomalous count
rate evolutions, as well as the original unshifted evolutions.
As can be seen from this plot, the shifted baseline evolution
is now further from the reference (original) baseline than the
shifted anomalous evolution. As a result, the performance
of a test deteriorates dramatically. At 5% FP rate, the TP
rate is 0.4%, compared to 95% in the absence of a detector
bias. The test attains the desired 95% TP rate only at the
FP rate of practically 100%. Thus, even a small bias in the
detector response severely weakens the statistical power of
the hypothesis test if an absolute comparison of count rate
trajectories is made.
The negative impact on the test of an absolute systematic
shift in detector response can be mitigated in two ways: either
by using relative count rate data, referred to a corrected value
measured at startup, or by comparison with a template from a
previous cycle known by other means to be standard.
For the first case, we investigated the TP rate of the
hypothesis test assuming the measured antineutrino count rates
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Fig. 3. Baseline (solid green), anomalous (solid red), shifted baseline (dashed
green) and shifted anomalous (dashed red) scenario evolutions of antineutrino
daily count rates versus time (in days), as simulated in ORIGEN.
are corrected by the difference between the predicted and
measured values averaged over the first 20 days of the cycle.
Thus, agreement of predicted and measured count rates at
beginning of cycle is enforced before the testing procedure is
applied. (This is equivalent to making an initial assumption
that no anomaly is present. When the shifted antineutrino
counts are corrected in this way, the TP rate is 12% at 5% FP
rate with 90 days of data acquisition, which is a significant
improvement over 0.4% TP rate reported above in the case of
shifted measurements not referred to an initial value (referred
to as “uncorrected” in Table II). When the acquisition period
is increased to 180 days, this correction yields a TP rate of
62% at the 5% FP rate. For 250 days, the TP rate is 96%,
which is only slightly below the rate in the absence of a shift
for the same acquisition period.
While a measurement relative to startup improves the power
of the test, the most favorable approach is to use a mea-
sured template for the antineutrino count rate, derived from
a previous cycle known to be standard by other means. By
definition, this removes any systematic detector bias, since the
relation between the baseline fuel evolution and the measured
antineutrino count rate has been empirically established. This
case reverts to our earlier result for high statistics acquisition -
95% TP rate and a 5% FP rate with 90 days of data acquisition.
The approach of using a predefined template from a previous
and well known fuel cycle has a further advantage that it
no longer depends on a reactor simulation and its associated
errors. This appears to be the most effective method for identi-
fying anomalous fuel loadings, so long as systematic errors in
antineutrino detector predicted and measured response remain
at the level of a few percent.
D. Effect of Operator Malfeasance
Equation (1) shows that both thermal power and fissile
isotopic content can be altered to change the antineutrino count
rate. Thus, in an attempt to conceal the removal of plutonium
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Fig. 4. ROC curves for the test applied to the original unshifted (purple)
and detector-shifted (orange) evolutions. The time period shown here is days
0-90 in the fuel cycle. The dotted vertical line corresponds to the FP rate of
5%, while the dashed and dotted horizontal line corresponds to the TP rate
of 95%.
in the present example, the reactor operator could report a
higher thermal power value than the true operating power. This
input information would cause the simulation to incorrectly
predict a systematic upward shift in the baseline evolution.
To assess the impact of a misreported power history, we
considered the effect of a 1% upward systematic shift of
the baseline evolution that was originally obtained from the
ORIGEN simulation (solid green curve in Fig. 1). Fig. 1
shows the resulting shifted baseline evolution (dashed green
curve). As can be seen from the plot, this evolution is much
less distinguishable from the anomalous evolution than the
true baseline evolution, so that this shift can be expected to
deteriorate the test’s performance.
Fig. 5 confirms this loss of sensitivity. Both ROC curves
shown in this plot were obtained from the test using count
rate data for days 0–90 in the cycle, assuming high counting
statistics. For this particular time period, the TP rate for the
test applied to the shifted baseline was as low as one-ninth of
that observed using the original baseline. For example, at the
FP rate of 5%, the TP rate of the former is 95%, while that
of the latter is 23%. In Section VII, we discuss operational
and experimental means to address the problem of deliberate
misreporting.
It should be noted that longer duration of data acquisition
reduces the impact of malfeasance. As Table II shows, with
high count rate data, the TP rates at 5% FP rate are respectively
56% and 99.99% for 250 and 500 days of data acquisition. The
complete ROC curves for the various acquisition times in the
case of the shifted baseline are shown in Fig. 7. Hence, even
in the presence of malfeasance, the anomaly can be detected
with high sensitivity if one acquires antineutrino data over the
entire cycle.
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Fig. 5. ROC curves for the test applied to the original unshifted (purple) and
operator-shifted (orange) baseline evolutions. The time period shown here is
days 0–90 in the fuel cycle. The dotted vertical line corresponds to the FP
rate of 5%, while the dashed and dotted horizontal line corresponds to the TP
rate of 95%.
E. Effect of the Starting Point and Duration of the Data
Acquisition Period
Naturally, the estimates of the evolution coefficients γˆ(M)i
and the test performance both improve as data are acquired for
longer periods. In our ROC curve simulation, we considered
the following four durations: days 0–500 (roughly full cycle
length), days 0–250 (half cycle length), days 0–90 and days
0–30 in the cycle. Fig. 6 shows the ROC curves for these four
duration periods, assuming high count rates. At the FP rate of
5%, the TP rate is 99.99% for 500 days versus 99%, 95% and
58% for 250, 90 and 30 days, respectively.
Moreover, as Fig. 1 reveals, when the baseline is shifted
due to incorrect input information, in addition to the duration
of data acquisition, the location of the time window in the
cycle during which the data are acquired will also affect the
performance of the test. For example, the shifted baseline
evolution is less distinguishable from the anomalous evolution
in the first 250 days of the cycle than in the last 250 days.
The same is true when comparing the first 90 days to the
last 90 days of the cycle. Therefore, we also compared the
performance of the test for the shifted baseline using high
count rate data from the first 90, last 90 (days 411-500), first
250, last 250 (days 251–500), and all 500 days of the cycle.
Fig. 7 shows the ROC curves for these five periods for
the case of the shifted baseline. As was noted earlier, as the
number of days goes down, the test performance degrades.
Moreover, the test applied to the count rate data for the last
250 days performs better than for the first 250 days because
the shifted baseline and the anomalous evolutions are further
apart at later times in the fuel cycle. The same is true when
comparing the performance for the first 90 days to the last 90
days. However, the test is less sensitive to the starting point
than to the duration of the data acquisition period.
These various effects are summarized in Table II. The effect
of duration and period was very similar for the low count rates,
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Fig. 6. ROC curves for the test using high count rates acquired over the full
cycle, or 500 days (turquoise), days 0–250 of the cycle (blue), days 0–90 of
the cycle (orange), and days 0–30 of the cycle (green). The dotted vertical
line corresponds to the FP rate of 5%, while the dashed and dotted horizontal
line corresponds to the TP rate of 95%.
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Fig. 7. ROC curves for the test applied to the operator-shifted baseline and
high count rates acquired over the full cycle, or 500 days (turquoise), first
250 days of the cycle (blue), last 250 days of the cycle (red), first 90 days of
the cycle (orange), and last 90 days of the cycle (green). The dotted vertical
line corresponds to the FP rate of 5%, while the dashed and dotted horizontal
line corresponds to the TP rate of 95%.
so these results are not included in the table.
VI. IMPACT ON DETECTOR DESIGN AND OPERATION
The test performance described above can be used to guide
the design of future safeguards antineutrino detectors. For a
given anomalous scenario and desired true and false positive
rate, a minimum antineutrino count rate requirement can be
established. Within practical limits set by the reactor site,
detector cost and complexity, a desired event rate may be
achieved by adjusting the detector standoff distance, size or
intrinsic efficiency.
As discussed earlier, the antineutrino rate in the SONGS1
8experiment [2] was approximately 360 counts per day at be-
ginning of cycle after subtraction of reactor-off backgrounds.
According to the ROC curve in Fig. 2, this antineutrino count
rate gives a 34% TP rate for a 5% FP rate with a 90-day
acquisition period. We assume that an acceptable test for IAEA
safeguards or a similar monitoring regime will require at least
95% TP rate at the 5% FP rate. In the previous sections, we
have shown that for the anomalous scenario we considered,
a 2000 count per day net antineutrino event rate is necessary
and sufficient to achieve this TP/FP rate combination.
The SONGS1 detector was located 24.5 meters from the
reactor core, with a 0.48 ton target mass, and 11% intrinsic
detection efficiency [5]. An increase in event rate compared
to SONGS1 could be accomplished by a combination of
reduced standoff distance, increased detector target mass
and/or increased intrinsic detection efficiency. For example,
at 24.5 meter standoff, a one ton detector with 30% intrinsic
efficiency, or a two ton detector with 15% intrinsic efficiency
would reach the 2000 count rate level and thus, the desired
95%/5% TP/FP rates. Alternatively, a one ton, 11% efficient
detector at 15 meter standoff would reach the same TP/FP rate
combination.
As shown in Table III, previous antineutrino detectors had
masses and efficiencies required to achieve the desired TP/FP
rate performance. The series of deployments at the Rovno
reactor complex in the Ukraine is of particular interest since
the efficiencies are high, while the overburden and other
conditions are similar to those that would be encountered in
many reactors under the IAEA safeguards. By contrast, the
high efficiency of the CHOOZ detector reflects the state of
the art for this class of detectors, but is achieved in part
through significantly greater overburden and reduced ambient
radioactivity compared to the other experiments, so such a
device is unlikely to be practical in a safeguards context.
TABLE III
POWER, MASS, STANDOFF DISTANCE, EFFICIENCY, AND
SIGNAL-TO-BACKGROUND RATIOS OF SOME PREVIOUS ANTINEUTRINO
EXPERIMENTS.
Experiment Power Mass Distance Efficiency Signal/Bkgd
(GW) (ton) (m) (%) Cts/Day
Rovno 1 [6] 1.375 0˜.5 18 20 909/149
Rovno 2 [16] 1.375 0˜.2 18 30 267/94
CHOOZ [17] 4.4 5.0 1000 69.8 24/1.2
Palo Verde [18] 11.6 11.3 800 10 200/300
SONGS1 [2] 3.4 0.64 24.5 11 564/105
Bugey [19] 3.4 0.64 24.5 10 62/2.5
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE WORK
This paper introduced a test procedure that determines
whether a given antineutrino count rate evolution significantly
deviates from that of the baseline. The procedure uses a
quadratic model for the antineutrino count rate as a function
of time since the beginning of the fuel cycle. However, the
procedure can be adapted to a much wider class of models. The
procedure involves least squares estimation of the parameters
in the quadratic model for the evolution in question and a
multiple hypothesis testing procedure, known as False Dis-
covery Rate (FDR), to determine whether at least one of the
estimated parameters is significantly different from its baseline
counterpart.
The anomalous operations identified in this paper do not
constitute a diversion scenario per se, since we have not spec-
ified the ultimate fate of the removed fuel. Instead, we have
estimated the sensitivity of antineutrino rate measurements
to changes in typical civil power reactor fuel loadings. An
important future exercise, best conducted by IAEA safeguards
experts, is a fuller analysis of the reactor safeguards implica-
tions of this novel bulk accountancy method.
While the specific performance of the test will depend on
the scenario, this work has identified the factors that most in-
fluence our ability to detect anomalous fuel loadings generally.
Among the factors that we considered, counting statistics, the
presence of detector bias, and introduction of a systematic shift
due to operator malfeasance had the most dramatic impact on
the test performance. High counting statistics collected over
longer periods of time in the absence of a deliberate shift in
the baseline or detector bias yield the best performance and
attain the target 95% TP rate at the 5% FP rate. We also found
that the effect of a systematic error in detector bias response
can be substantially reduced by an initial correction of the
predicted to the observed count rates, or most effectively by
an empirical calibration of detector response using antineutrino
count rate data from a previous fuel cycle. The latter approach
has the further advantage of lessening the dependence of the
method on a reactor simulation. Changes in the starting point
of data acquisition had a smaller impact on the performance.
Past experience has demonstrated that increasing the an-
tineutrino count rate through efficiency or mass increases
is achievable, so that our target 95% TP / 5% FP rate
combination can be attained with practical detectors. More
problematic in a safeguards context is the issue of deliberate
misreporting of power levels on the part of the operator that
would undermine the statistical power of our test. While this
is a serious concern, we note that the operator’s misreporting
must be fully consistent with the antineutrino data, which
are independently acquired by and remain under the control
of the safeguards inspector. This independently acquired in-
formation places an important additional constraint on the
operator compared to current practice, in which declarations,
along with item accountancy, are the primary sources of
quantitative information about the reactor thermal power and
fuel loading. Moreover, the misrepresentation must be tuned
to the particular anomalous operational state chosen by the
operator. If different amounts or types of fissile material are
removed, the hypothesis test may still detect a significant
departure from the baseline. To further examine the robustness
of this method, it is necessary to investigate a wider class of
anomalous scenarios, varying both fuel and reactor type.
As described in [20], a direct measurement of the antineu-
trino spectrum would provide sufficient information to simul-
taneously constrain both power and fissile isotopic content.
This would severely undermine or even eliminate the benefit
to the operator of misreporting the thermal power. However,
since the antineutrino rate per energy bin will be necessarily
reduced, the statistical power of the test may be compromised,
or, alternatively, a larger detector may be required than is the
9case for a pure rate measurement. In future work, we will
apply a hypothesis testing procedure on a spectrally resolved
antineutrino measurement, including realistic statistical and
systematic uncertainties, to quantify any additional sensitivity
inherent in the spectral analysis.
Finally, as noted earlier, we used an ORIGEN simulation
of the SONGS Unit 2 reactor core. Assemblies were assumed
to have no spatial extent: the only spatial information in our
calculation was the variation in distance of each pointlike
assembly from the detector. A full three-dimensional treatment
of the assemblies would allow inclusion of effects, such as the
variation of the centroid of fission over the cycle.
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